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This paper analyses how Cournot‟s views on Monopoly have influenced the 
marginalists authors. It is argued that there are two different points of view in the 
cournotian evaluation of the consequence of Monopoly. The first one is a purely 
theoretical construction adopted in modern economic theory. Even if it is a 
theoretical one it has normative consequence. From these it is derived a negative 
appreciation on Monopoly. The second is a more pragmatic point of view. 
Whereas the former is purely theoretical the latter is derived from multiple 
examples and it cannot be based on the same theoretical framework as the well 
known theory of monopoly prices. From this pragmatic point of view, Cournot 
constructs some “positive” appreciations on the existence of monopolies.  
These two different appreciations on imperfect markets have influenced in 
different ways the works of the authors of the Marginal Revolution. Following this 
distinction we study the different points of view of Walras, Edgeworth and 
Marshall on Monopoly. We show that even if Walras‟s theory of Monopoly does 
not have the same theoretical foundations of Cournot‟s, his normative point of 
view on monopolies is closely related with the “purely theoretical” conclusions. 
Walras frequently quoted Cournot on these matters. Edgeworth and Marshall 
have a different point of view on Monopoly, mainly pragmatic and sometimes 
quite positive from the normative point of view. However Walras‟s as well as 
Edgeworth‟s and Marshall‟s theories on monopoly are not based on their theories 
of perfect competition. We conclude that the marginlists views on imperfect 
competition are not constructed as a “perturbation” or a “friction” of a perfectly 
competitive market.  
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Early Neoclassical views on Monopoly: the Cournotian heritage.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
This paper analyses how Cournot‟s views on Monopoly have influenced the 
early neoclassical authors. It is argued that there are two different points of 
view in the cournotian evaluation of the consequence of Monopoly. The first 
one is a purely theoretical construction adopted in modern economic theory. 
Even if it is a theoretical one it has normative consequence. From these it is 
derived a negative appreciation on Monopoly. The second is a more 
pragmatic point of view. Whereas the former is purely theoretical the latter is 
derived from multiple examples and it cannot be based on the same 
theoretical framework as the well known theory of monopoly prices. From 
this pragmatic point of view, Cournot constructs some “positive” 
appreciations on the existence of monopolies. 
  
These two different appreciations on imperfect markets have influenced in 
different ways the works of the authors of the Marginal Revolution. 
Following this distinction we study the different points of view of Walras, 
Edgeworth and Marshall on Monopoly. We show that even if Walras‟s theory 
of Monopoly does not have the same theoretical foundations of Cournot‟s, 
his normative point of view on monopolies is closely related with the “purely 
theoretical” conclusions. Walras frequently quoted Cournot on these 
matters. Edgeworth and Marshall have a different point of view on 
Monopoly, mainly pragmatic and sometimes quite positive from the 
normative point of view. However Walras‟s as well as Edgeworth‟s and 
Marshall‟s theories on monopoly are not based on their theories of perfect 
competition. We conclude that the marginlists views on imperfect 
competition are not constructed as a “perturbation” or a “friction” of a 
perfectly competitive market. 
 
Even if Cournot‟s theory of Monopoly has an important place in modern 
Economics, most historians of economics has focused his attention on his 
methodological legacy as the precursor of mathematical economics. Two 
recent papers try to avoid this common view on Cournot. Friedman (2000) 
presents the successive historical stages of this legacy. He concludes that the 
cournotian influence on Walras, Edgeworth and Marshall relies on the 
theory of oligopoly and the famous Bertrand-Cournot debate. Monopoly 
theory is not mentioned as main issue. Dos Santos Ferreira (2004) focuses 
his attention on a more general conception of competition, including 
Monopoly, Oligopoly and Perfect Competition. However, this author focuses 
his attention on the cooperative vs. non-cooperative aspects of these 
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analyses. We agree in the general views of Dos Santos Ferreira‟s paper, but 
we propose an original lecture of the analysis on normative views of the 
authors on Monopoly. Our analysis enriched the literature on Cournot‟s 
legacy extending the study to his non-mathematical work on economics 
(Cournot 1863) which has been neglected in most of the literature. We 
propose also to go further into the analysis of Walras‟s and Edgeworth‟s 
normative works to go further in our comparative analysis. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: A description of Cournot‟s pure 
theory of Monopoly followed by an analysis of his normative views on the 
matter. In the fourth section we consider, first, the influence on Walras‟s 
theoretical and political positions on Monopoly and finally we contrast it 
with the influence of Cournot‟s views on Edgeworth and Marshall. 
 
2. Cournot pure theory of competition and monopoly  
 
For Cournot, perfect competition is only a limit case of a general analysis on 
the determination of prices. Cournot‟s general theory of competition aims at 
providing a rationale (to give an explicit rational argument) to the 
determination of prices in order to go further than the “common sense” 
notions of the, nowadays named, demand and supply laws. He believes that 
the propositions like “The price of a commodity is increasing on its demand”, 
are sterile from a scientific point of view2 . His alternative proposition 
consists in providing a representation of the market for a particular good, 
composed by a given demand function depending on the price (decreasing), 
with a passive behavior, and a strategic behavior on the supply side of the 
market. The attention is thus focused on the actions of producers, namely 
their strategic choices. This reasoning leads him to build the basic 
framework for what is today known as Industrial Organization and the policy 
issues derived from it. 
 
Cournot‟s theory of prices does not aim at providing an explanation of the 
coordination process of a system of markets. It is not a theory of value of the 
general equilibrium model, because there is no such an idea of general 
coordination of self interested agents. Even if Cournot considers the mutual 
influence of different goods, and thus different markets, on the 
determination of the price of each of them (chapter 9 in Cournot 2001), this 
is only to consider the case of a collusion of complementary inputs 
contributing to the production of the same good. The main concern of the 
                                                 
2 Cournot (2001: 35-36), chapter 4, paragraph 20. 
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cournotian framework is whether different degrees of competition affect in 
different ways the final price of a simple good. This constitutes the basis for a 
solution of multiple applied questions. More precisely, the goal of Cournot‟s 
theory of competition is to contribute to the analysis of the distribution of 
wealth and to provide a rational for the regulation of the market:  
 
 
“… s'agit-il de savoir comment, par suite de changements dans les conditions 
de la production ou dans les relations commerciales, les prix hausseront, 
baisseront, se nivelleront; comment les profits ou les pertes se repartiront 
entre les proprietaires, les entrepreneurs, les ouvriers …” (Cournot 1863, 
paragraph 11, p: 19-20) 
 
The main achievement of Cournot‟s theory is the possibility to apply the 
same principle to different degrees of competition, starting by the pure 
monopoly case. This implies that perfect competition (i.e. unlimited 
competition3) is nor a theoretical, neither a normative, benchmark situation. 
On the contrary, perfect competition is a particular case4 where each 
producer or competitor has a null marginal incidence on the price. This 
situation is attained, not only by the presence of a great number of 
competitors, but also by the presence of a “threat” for every producer, related 
to the presence of a perfect substitute for each one of them. The whole 
theoretical framework is thus constructed upon strategic behavior of agents. 
A monopolist has to anticipate the variations of the demand for his own good 
in order to obtain the maximum level of profit (Cournot 2001, chapter 5). 
When a few number (i.e. two for the simplest case) of competitors is present 
in the market, the space of strategies (as defined in modern strategic game 
theoretical analysis) is enlarged to take account, not only of the demand but 
also of the others competitors‟ strategies (Cournot 2001, chapter 7). Finally, 
when a collusion among producers is possible (Cournot 2001, chapter 9), the 
strategic behavior is still the defining feature of individuals‟ behavior. In this 
case, we cannot talk about a cooperative game solution for the stability of the 
coalition of producers. On the contrary, the case proposed by Cournot when 
the case of collusion among producers is analyzed, is not that of producers of 
the same good deciding to take advantage of monopoly power, but the 
formation of a group of producers of different inputs taking part in the 
production of a unique final good acting together as a monopolist. From this, 
                                                 
3 Concurrence indefinie (Chapter 8 in Cournot 2001). 
 
4 See some arguments in Dos Santos Ferreira & Gérard-Varet (2000) and Dos Santos (2002) and 
(2004). 
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it follows that each of the participant has interest to take part in the collusion 
taking into account common information: the demand for the final good. The 
strategic behavior is not eliminated but reinforced, and the final solution of 
this situation is an “artificial” monopoly. 
 
The cournotian approach to competition is thus based on the strategic 
interaction of producers in partial equilibrium analysis. It is important to 
remark that he solution concept proposed by Cournot does not presuppose 
the knowledge of the entire set of strategies for every producer (or player). 
However, the analysis leading to establish a well defined solution for every 
case is based on reasoning where, by successive approximations, the players 
discover the relevant set of information about others‟ strategies. Some 
authors have underlined the limits of this dynamic analysis, and in particular 
its lack of coherence because it supposes that during the “try and error” 
process for one player, an ad-hoc ceteris paribus hypothesis is supposed5. 
This criticism is somehow extreme. The final solution of the problem, given 
by Cournot, is not false and the suggestion of a dynamic process is a 
pedagogical device. He is well aware of the problems of stability related to 
problems of information or possible errors on expectations of the players:  
 
“En d‟autres termes, cet état ne sera pa une situation d‟équilibre stable ; et, 
bien que le plus favorable aux deux producteurs, il ne pourra subsister à 
moins d‟un lien formel ; parce qu‟on ne peut pas plus supposer, dans le 
monde moral, des hommes exempts d‟erreurs et d‟inconsidération, que dans 
la nature physique des corps parfaitement rigides, des appuis parfaitement 
fixes, et ainsi de suite” (Cournot 2001, chapter 7, paragraph 44: 62) 
 
 
In the case of Monopoly, the same “pedagogical” device is proposed. Cournot 
supposes that the monopolist producer does not know the actual demand he 
is facing. It is gradually discovered by successive approximations, proposing 
prices producing a reaction on demand and a particular level of income for 
the monopolist. Given a constant demand function, and the passive 
character we have underlined so far, the monopolist will finally unveil the 
actual form of this function and solve the maximization of his benefit. This is 
obviously a way to give an empirical sensation of the solution of the 
monopolist problem, otherwise the hypothesis of perfect information and 
thus an omniscient agent could be too shocking for the reader. Moreover, as 
                                                 
5 It has been emphasized by some authors that Cournot solution to the oligopoly case is an early 
version of the Nash equilibrium notion (Negishi 2001). 
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we will show in the next section, Cournot‟s analysis of the welfare 
consequence and the regulation policy are based on comparative statics. This 
therefore requires a solution concept as a benchmark for the analysis and the 
same solution concept for the final situation. This is not too different from 
the standard Industrial Organization analysis nowadays. The main 
difference is that modern normative analysis, economics have adopted a 
procedure where the “first best” situation of the perfect competition 
framework constitutes the benchmark for the policy implication analysis. In 
the cournotian framework, the negative consequences of monopoly are 
judged from the point of view of political considerations and an idea of the 
“general interest” opposed to the “particular interest” following a very simple 
normative principle other than what economics uses today: namely the 
Pareto optimality. 
 
3. The cournotian normative analysis  
 
The normative statements in Cournot‟s work are not very explicit in his best 
known “Recherches sur les principes mathématiques des richesses …” 
(Cournot 2001). In order to grasp clearer the policy implications of his 
analysis we have to explore his non-mathematical book “Principes de la 
théorie des richesses” (Cournot 1863). Even if the later has being considered 
as a merely transcription into non-mathematic language of the former, 
Cournot announces in the preface (“au lecteur”) of this work the presence of 
some developments going further his first economic work. Little attention 
has been paid to these developments. “j'ai repris man travail de 1838 en le 
corrigeant, en le developpant là où les developpements manquaient, en le 
completant sur les points auxquels je m'étais abstenu de toucher, et surtout 
en le depouillant absolument de l'attirail d'algebre qui effarouche tant en ces 
matières” (Cournot 1863, Au lecteur: II) 
 
In particular, Cournot‟s statements on policy matters have been almost 
completely ignored by modern cournotians and historians of economic 
thought. In his 1863 book he presents the basic notions of his theory on 
prices with special emphasis on his main achievement on monopoly price: 
 
“Il (the monopolist) pourrait, à la faveur de son monopole, fixer à vingt 
francs le prix du litre de cette eau·: mais il s'apercevrait bien vite,à la rarete 
des demandes, que ce prix n'est pas le plus avantageux pour lui·: il 
l'abaissera donc successivement, puis le relèvera un peu si l'expérience lui 
montre qu'il l'a par trop abaissé et, finalement, il s'arrêtera au taux qui lui 
donne le plus gros revenue …” (Cournot 1863, chapter 7: 107)  
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We can recognize here the pedagogical exposition of the discovery, by the 
monopolist, of the demand function of the market and the well known 
conclusion: the monopolist fixes the maximum price he can obtain from the 
market demand. He then presents another general conclusion of his first 
economic work: the increasing presence of competitors within a market 
leads to a reduction in the price of the good and an increasing of the level of 
production. This is a “common sense” argument to argue the desirability of 
competition and of the establishment of a free market regime. However, in 
very last chapters of the same book, Cournot presents a surprising argument 
against perfect competition and in favor of monopoly.  
 
The notion of competition, in this non-mathematic work, is free from the 
pure formal considerations of his first book. In fact, in his early book he is 
restrained to present the competition between producers not as a struggle 
aiming at obtaining more market-power, namely to attract a greater part of 
the market demand. This is in fact the origin of the well-known criticism by 
Bertrand. Following the later, the cournotian analysis of competition ignores 
the fact that an increase in the price asked by a producer leads to a loss of the 
whole demand and a proportional increase on the demand for his 
competitor‟s product. As it is easy to observe, Bertrand‟s criticism is based on 
a very different conception of the role of the demand side of the market on 
the determination of prices. As we stated above, Cournot‟s pure theory of 
price (as developed in his first book) is based on the analysis of the active 
strategic behavior of producers under the assumption of a constant (i.e. 
passive) market demand. The surprise arrives in his late book, when Cournot 
develops the following argument on the negative consequences of perfect 
competition: 
 
“s'il ya dans le monopole un príncipe de desaccord entre l'interêt particuIier 
et l'interet general, il y en a un autre dans la concurrence, qui ne frappe 
guère moins aujord'hui les yeux de la foule. Quand l'aiguillon de la 
concurrence pousse à avilir les prix, et notamment le prix du travail, jusqu‟à 
amener le malaise des producteurs et à vicier les organes de la production, il 
ne nuit pas seulement à ceux  
qui en souffrent immediatement; il devient nuisible au corps social tout 
entier, quelque avantage apparent qu'il donne pour le moment à d'autres 
classes de la societe: de même que le corps vivant tout entier souffre de 
l'embonpoint d'un organe qui derobe à d'autres organes les sucs nourriciers. 
(…) Si de plus la concurrence pousse à alterer les qualites, à séduire les 
consommateurs par l'apparence d'une economie mal entendue,à produire 
plus que les debouches ne peuvent ecouler, ce qui ramene périodiquement 
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des crises commerciales, ses inconvenients, pour le corps social comme pour 
les producteurs eux mêmes seront encore plus evidents; et pourtant il ne l'est 
pas moins que la libre concurrece doit amener de tels resultats.” (Cournot 
1863, book IV, chapter II: 436-437, we underline) 
 
The two arguments presented in this quotation cannot be sustained on the 
basis of the pure theoretical framework developed in the “Recherches sur les 
principles mathématiques …”. The first argument is based on the analysis of 
an integrated system of markets (i.e. general equilibrium analysis). As we 
have showed so far, Cournot‟s theory of prices and competition was 
developed within a partial equilibrium analysis. The second argument is 
even more striking for it appeals to a theory of competition where the 
producers are trying to gain part of the market demand against other 
producers. In particular, trying to “séduire les consommateurs” implies a 
conception of the demand in contradiction with his assumption on the 
independence of the demand functions faced by each producer (Cournot 
2001, chapter 7, paragraph 43: 59-60). This hypothesis, was exploted by the 
well-known Bertrand‟s criticism and well noticed by Edgeworth (1881): 
Starting with complete monopoly, we shall find the price continually 
diminish as the number of monopolists increases, until the point of complete 
fluidity is reached. This gradual „extinction‟ of the influence of monopoly is 
well traced by Cournot in a discussion masterly, but limited by a particular 
condition, which may be called uniformity of price, not (it is submitted) 
abstractedly necessary in cases of imperfect competition.” (47) 
 
Two interesting conclusions can be derived from these surprising changes on 
Cournot‟s arguments. On the one hand, even if his theory of oligopoly was 
developed under the assumption of “fixed prices”, his normative point of 
view is built upon a different conception of the organization of the markets. 
Dos Santos Ferreira (2004) resumes very clearly Cournot‟s pure theory of 
oligopoly: “La notion de concurrence s‟insère donc chez Cournot dnas un 
schema non cooperative, où le principe d‟uniformité du prix impose 
cependant une forte coordination” (545) 
 
Under this pure theoretical conception (i.e. the one developed in his early 
book) the competitors do not have the power to attract his competitors‟ 
demand because there is an automatic adjustment process leading the prices 
of other competitors to align. As Dos Santos Ferreira (2004) also noticed: 
“D‟une certaine manière, les producteurs cournotiens, agissant chacun de 
son côté, se comportment encore en monopoleurs, quoique sur une frange 
du marché” (545). This automatic mechanism of price alignment is 
abandoned in his normative analysis about competition. Following this 
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change in his conception of the organization of market, in favor maybe of a 
more empirical one, Cournot also concludes that the Monopoly could achieve 
more suitable results because it is a more stable situation. In opposition to 
the erratic behavior of a competitive market, where producers are guided by 
their permanent anxiety to gain a part of the total demand against their 
competitors, the monopolist is never menaced and thus never pushed to act 
in an irrational manner. These pragmatic considerations are very similar to 
those we find in Marshall‟s and Edgeworth‟s works. 
 
On the other hand, the presence of some elements of a general equilibrium 
framework is the confirmation of an early sliding already present in his first 
book. In the XIth chapter of this book, Cournot take some risks to go into the 
perils of a general equilibrium analysis. But he renounces very fast to 
continue further. As Dos Santos Ferreira & Gérard-Varet (2000) recognize it, 
Cournot tries to avoid the difficulties of general equilibrium, in particular, 
the necessary modifications on the demand functions. These lead to the 
introduction of the income and the prices of other commodities as changing 
arguments of the function and not as parameters like in a partial equilibrium 
conception. If we return to Cournot‟s late book (1863) we can find that a 
great part of the book is developed exploring this kind of considerations. The 
effect of competition on wages is but one example of this. Cournot analysis 
the bad consequence of competition on wages and concludes that the 
organization of workers unions is well justified by the effects of competition 
(Cournot 1863: book III, chapter X). Moreover, at least two thirds of this 
books are related to considerations of a very complex framework taking into 
account the interactions between different sectors of an integrated system of 
markets. 
 
Most of these conclusions on competition and the normative appreciation of 
the negative consequences competition and the positives of monopoly have 
being neglected by the second hand place given to Cournot‟s late book. We 
can now advance a conclusion about the role of those different views on 
Monopoly and competition in Cournot‟s global work: his pure theoretical 
conception leads him to conclude on the traditional evaluation on monopoly 
as a undesirable situation because of the possibility for the monopolists to 
fixed a high price and a low supply. However, a more pragmatic view on 
monopoly, based on a general equilibrium framework, allows him softening 
this conclusion and giving a more complex normative point of view. We can 
now go into the history of the early heritage of Cournot‟s views to show how 
this different point of views are to be found in authors like Walras, 
Edgeworth and Marshall. 
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4. The legacy of the two views on competition 
 
 It is necessary to repeat that we do not pretend to assert that the influence of 
Cournot on the authors we will consider is a direct one. To be sure, even if it 
is easy and it has been well documented that Cournot‟s first work on 
economics was read and well appreciated by those authors, it is not clear 
whether they were as interested on his 1863 book as they were on the first. 
Nonetheless, we will try to show that both views on monopoly are associated 
with those authors and, most important, that the reasons and the theoretical 
implications of those views are related to those we found in Cournot‟s works. 
Walras: monopoly theory as applied economics and the 
commutative justice precept  
 
As it is confirmed by Walras himself, he was influenced by Cournot‟s 
reading. But this influence is only recognized on two matters: 1) the 
methodological position of Cournot‟s as a champion of the mathematical 
economics school; 2)the pure theory of monopoly as presented in Cournot‟s 
first book. It is not necessary to go deeper into the importance Walras gave 
to the mathematical language. as its natural one, for economics. On this 
point, Walras recognizes the main place of Cournot as the founder father of 
the school. In particular, he acknowledges the primacy of Cournot‟s theory of 
demand. Nonetheless, Walras considers that Cournot‟s demand function was 
incomplete for it lacks of the prices of other commodities and the income as 
arguments of the function. Briefly, Cournot was wrong to try to construct a 
model within a partial equilibrium framework. Associated with this criticism, 
Walras accused Cournot to be too much interested on “applied economics” 
(i.e. empirical questions). This sounds, as far as our considerations are true, 
very contradictory with the points of views Cournot develops in his last book. 
In fact, as we have showed, the empirical issues and the normative 
considerations on competition are analyzed by Cournot within a general 
equilibrium framework (of course, not completely developed as Walras‟ one). 
Here we find the first, contradictory legacy of Cournot analysis on monopoly. 
 
The pure theory of Monopoly as applied economics  
 
In his “Élements d‟Économie Politique Pure”, Walras (1988) includes, as his 
last chapter (41th lesson), some considerations on Monopoly. Given the 
strict separation between Pure and Applied economics for Walras, this 
chapter may be considered as an intruder. In fact, we find the same subject 
as part of his “Études d‟Économie Politique Appliquée” (Walras 1992). 
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However, the main difference between those expositions on Monopoly lies 
on the fact that in the “pure economics” book, Walras develops, what we 
could name a “pure theory” of Monopoly. This theory, as Walras himself 
recognized it, is Cournot‟s theory with a little contribution of Dupuit‟s 
analysis. We can thus argue that Walras‟s pure theoretical conception of 
Monopoly is direct legacy of Cournot‟s. However, two warnings must be 
given here. First, Walras‟s notice at the very beginning of his 41th lesson on 
Monopoly (in his Elements of pure economics) that one main assumption of 
his entire book has to be abandoned: “celle de la libre concurrence absolue 
en mati€`re d‟échange, de production et de capitalization. Ainsi, ce que nous 
connaissons, ce sont les effets de la libre concurrence. Mais quoi qu‟en 
disent, ou qu‟en paraissent dire, assez souvent les economistes, la libre 
concurrence n‟est pas le seul mode possible d‟organisation de l‟industrie…” 
(Walras 1988: 655). 
In fact, following his methodological conception, Walras seems to talk about 
Monopoly as a “imperfection” of the market. As a “perturbation” of the 
perfect competition situation. This methodological conception, which has 
been inherited by the neo-walrasian Arrow-Debreu model, implies that a 
more realistic case must be understood and judged as a perturbation of a 
more general, but purely theoretical, situation: the perfect competitive 
general equilibrium. However, the reader of the 41th lesson is disappointed.  
 
Walras‟s exposition of the Monopoly theory is developed within a partial 
equilibrium framework. This is obvious, because it is a direct legacy of 
Cournot‟s (2001) chapter V. However, the epistemological status of this pure 
theory of Monopoly is reversed in Walras‟s work. For Walras, this is an 
applied question, related thus to normative issues. 
 
The normative judgment on Monopoly as matter of justice  
 
After having presented Cournot‟s theory of Monopoly in his “Pure 
Economics” book, Walras go into an important policy issue: the question 
about the railroads management. Walras‟s posture on these matters is quite 
surprising: He advocates in favor of the necessity for the Estate to provide 
this service and against the privatization of it.  
 
The main argument to justify this view on Monopoly is related with a 
fundamental building block of Walras‟s whole intellectual program: namely 
his conception of justice. Following this conception, the general competitive 
equilibrium situation is a normative benchmark because of his normative 
properties. Without going further on this questions (see Jaffé 1977), we can 
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use a quotation from the mentioned chapter on Monopoly in Walras‟s 
“Applied Economics” book:  
 
“Qu‟il n‟y ait, pour les services et pour les produits, qu‟un seul prix sur le 
marché, celui auquel a lieu l‟égalité de l‟offre et de la demande, et que le prix 
de vente des produits soit égal à leur prix de revient en services, ces deux 
conditions n‟en Font qu‟une seule et unique quie est que les services 
s‟échangent les un contre les autres suivant des proportions comunes 
résultant des dispostions de tous leurs propiétaires; et cette condition est 
une condition de justice …” (Walras 1992: 186, we underline) 
 
This quotation sums up the role of the competitive equilibrium as a norm of 
justice which constitutes a normative and a theoretical point of reference. A 
normative one because Walras always judges the “imperfect competition 
situations” as deviations from the “first best” situation of perfect 
competition. But also a theoretical reference, because in order to 
understand, from an analytical point of view, a particular organization of the 
market, the walrasian analysis describes it as a departure from the this 
theoretical referent. It is thus also a methodology for pure economics and not 
only a normative analysis (see Benetti 1997).  
 
To grasp the implication of this methodological point of view for Walras‟s 
conception of Monopoly and his political position in favor of the intervention 
of the Estate on the railroad industry, we have to explain how Walras‟s judge 
the Monopoly as a transgression of the two main features of the perfect 
competitive situation. This will allow us to understand how Walras‟s 
normative analysis on Monopoly leads him to propose a modification on the 
theoretical conception of Cournot‟s pure theory. 
 
On the one hand, the Monopoly goes against the equality between costs (i.e. 
prix de revient) and total income for the entrepreneur (i.e. prix de vente). 
The explanation of this is given by the strict application of Cournot‟s pure 
theory of Monopoly: a monopolist can sell at high price because of his 
market power. On the other hand, and here comes the theoretical departure 
from the cournotian framework, the monopolist is always capable to 
discriminate prices for each consumer. Here, Walras follows Dupuit‟s theory 
against the assumption of the unique price postulated by Cournot. Walras 
gives us a quotation by Dupuit:  
 
“‟Cette solution, dit Dupuit, repose sur ce principe général, c‟est qu‟il faut 
demander pour prix du service rendu non pas ce qu‟il coûte à celui qui le 
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rend, mais une somme ne rapport avec l‟importance qu‟y attaché celui à qui 
il est rendu. 
 
Nous ne saurions, quant à nous, accepter sans restrictions ce soi-disant 
principe qui, énoncé d‟une facon aussi absolue, serait destructive de toute 
justice.‟” (Walras 1992: 192) We now come to the core of the normative 
problem. It is because the railroad is a natural monopoly, that it cannot be 
given to the private capital to exploit it: because of an argument of justice. 
Thus, it belongs to the Estate, the community as a whole, to take control of 
the railroads to avoid the unjustices of private monopolist. In fact, a private 
monopolist will charge a differentiated price scheme. On the contrary, the 
Estate will charge only the cost of production (i.e. prix de revient). We will 
show it in the next section that there is an important difference between 
Walras and Edgeworth – Marshall, concerning this particular point of view.  
 
Summing up, Walras has a normative position against the existence of 
private monopolies. This is supported on a theoretical conception of it that 
departures from the Cournotian pure theory following Dupuit‟s theory of 
differentiation price policy of monopolists. Even if Cournot‟s normative 
analysis on monopolies is built upon a general equilibrium framework, we 
showed that Walras takes the opposite way around: the theoretical 
framework within which he tackles the case of monopoly is the partial 
equilibrium analysis of a mixture of Cournot and Dupuit theories. 
 
Edgeworth and Marshall: some normative coincidence in a 
different theoretical framework  
 
Edgeworth and Marshall highly praised Cournot. In particular the 
recognized his originality and audacity putting economics into a 
mathematical language. However, both departed from Cournot analysis of 
the oligopoly model, introducing this analysis in a different conception of the 
notion of competition. Concerning Cournot‟s monopoly theory, both 
Marshall and Edgeworth, agree on its basic conclusions, but they saw this 
model as the most primitive theory of Monopoly. The both tried to enriched, 
not to abandon, the cournotionan framework. Nevertheless, this theoretical 
enrichment leads them to throw away the main theoretical hypothesis of 
Cournot‟s pure theory of Monopoly. 
 
Edgeworth (2003), following Marshall (Marshall 1890, book V, Chapter 13), 
states that Cournot‟s theory of the price of monopoly is only a particular 
case. The general case, according to Edgeworth, is not to suppose that the 
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monopolist is constantly threaten by competitors. This conception of the 
monopoly derives from their general views on competition. In fact, the well-
known notion of recontracting (Edgeworth 1881) supposes the existence of a 
permanent menace point for every competitor. The whole theory of prices in 
Edgeworth, is built upon the assumption of the constant possibility to break 
contracts and recontract with other agents. In this sense, the edgeworthian 
market is view as a huge zone where information flaws are essential. In this 
framework, Edgeworth proposes the following idea: if a monopolist is trying 
to keep his market power, he cannot ask for the maximum price an agent 
would pay, but an intermediary price between his own marginal cost of 
production and this maximum level. Here we rejoin the Marshallian 
influence on Edgeworth. Marshall has presented a concept for this situation 
which he called (Marshall 1890, Ibid) the Compromised Benefit. Both 
English authors considered that the general case is this constantly threaten 
monopolist. The case where the monopoly can put the highest price is what 
Edgeworth presents as nonsense: 
 
“That is, excepting the arbitrary supposition that the second monopolist is 
such a fool as to act in the manner ascribed to him by Cournot's equation. 
But even if he were to do so, though there would exist a definite position of 
equilibrium, it would not be the one assigned by the theory here combated.” 
(Edgeworth 1925: 138) 
 
 Edgeworth transposed the analysis of monopoly into a quasi-competitive 
framework. Being more precise, Edgeworth‟s analysis consists on the case of 
a monopolist which is potentially confronted to the presence of some 
competitors: this means an oligopoly case. In fact Egeworth‟s general price 
theory is a generalization of an oligopoly case where: 1) the pure monopolist 
of Cournot can only exist if and only if he has the whole monopoly of the 
market, namely he has a “natural monopoly” in Edgeworth‟s conception; 2) 
the perfect competitive situation is attained when a important number of 
competitors go into the market and the information about contracts is 
public. 
 
Upon this theoretical framework, Edgeworth nourishes a normative 
appreciation on monopoly very close to Marshall‟s and Cournot‟s. In fact, the 
three authors under consideration, have some arguments in favor of the 
existence of private monopolies. This contrasts with Walras‟s radical 
opposition. The arguments are also very different from those that Walras 
could accept. Edgeworth sums up very clear his normative position: 
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“In general, prices under monopoly are higher than they would have been 
under competition, other things being equal. But other things are not equal, 
for the expenses of production are apt to 
be less under monopoly, owing (1) to the advantages of production on a large 
scale; (2) the avoidance of waste in advertising against each other some 
3.000.000 dollars, of which two-thirds at least could be saved by 
combination.” (Edgeworth 2003: 487) 
 
These empirical arguments in favor of the monopolists have a similar status 
as those by Cournot, presented above. However, two important differences 
are present here: the presence of increasing returns to scale and the costs of 
advertising. However, this last point is not too far from the cournotian idea 
that monopolists do not have be worry about competitors. Marshall in the 
third book of his “Industry and trade” (Marshall 1919).  
 
Edgeworth‟s partial defense of monopoly is supported on his general price 
theory, however, Cournot has to go further, or even to abandon his price 
theory and rely on purely empirical appreciations. In fact, the case of 
increasing returns and, even clearer, the save on advertising expenses is 
perfectly conceivable as a case within Edgeworth‟s analysis, because the 
presence of the threatening competitors. Nonetheless, a general equilibrium 
approach à la Cournot, could possible get rid of those situations. It is finally 
clear that those cases cannot fit into any consideration of walrasian pure 
price theory for the absence of strategic behaviors is the main characteristic 
of it. 
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